|
|
|
|
|
“The Literal method is now completely out of date. It has been replaced by the approach which Lord Diplock described as ‘purposive’ approach … In all cases now in the interpretation of statutes we adopt such a construction as will ‘promote the general leg
|
|
|
“The Literal method is now completely out of date. It has been replaced by the approach which Lord Diplock described as ‘purposive’ approach … In all cases now in the interpretation of statutes we adopt such a construction as will ‘promote the general legislative purpose underlying the provision’ ” Per Lord Denning MR in Nothman v London Borough of Barnet [1978] 1 All ER 1243, 1246. Discuss the above statement, with references to decided cases. Introduction Lord Denning’s statement above has been a contentious one and has led to many debates in the legal environment. The main issue in the above statement is one of Statutory Interpretation and Parliamentary Sovereignty. Various methods, rules, approaches and practices are used to interpret legislation. There is nothing unusual in the process of interpretation as it is the ordinary function of the courts to give meaning to statutory provisions.[1] However when the wording used in a statute is not clear this leads to problems. These problems are then left to the Judges to determine. In order to understand the various problems the Judges face in interpreting statutory provision, these ‘problems’ will be described briefly. Particular attention will be given to the literal method and the purposive approach. Subsequently, I will also very briefly describe other methods or ‘tools’ of interpretation briefly so as to provide a clear overview of Statutory Interpretation. The role of judges will be discussed as well. In matters of statutory interpretation, the strict constitutional view is that the role of a judge is interpretive only. The role of the judges in relation to statutes is to interpret them. This means that they have to give meaning to the words used in the statutes. If there are any uncertainties or ambiguities in the words used to interpret the statute it is the judges function to resolve the uncertainties and ambiguities. The question that has to be addressed is the boundaries within which judges should remain in order to interpret statutes sensibly whilst at the same time accepting the fact that Parliament is the supreme law making body. The English language is such that even Englishmen who are highly experienced lawyers, known as Parliamentary Counsel find it very difficult to construct a whole piece of legislation without some ambiguity in its wordings. Particular problems that can arise are now discussed below first. Problems Ambiguity in a statute can arise when a word used can have two or more meanings. By using an ambiguous word, the person or persons (draftsman) may give a statute a meaning opposite to that which Parliament intended. For example, in Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394, under the Section 1 of Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 it was an offence to ‘offer for sale’ an offensive weapon. The defendant had displayed flick-knifes for sale in his shop-window. He was charged with offering these for sale. However, in contract law when goods are displayed in a shop, they are not in fact being offered for sale but are an ‘invitation to treat’. The defendant, therefore had not committed an offence. The purpose of the Act had been defeated by careless drafting. Even unambiguous words may need interpretation as in Section 33(1) of the Race Relations Act 1976. Section 33 of the Act (as amended) provides: "(1) A person who knowingly aids another person to do an act made unlawful by this Act shall be treated for the purposes of this Act as himself doing an unlawful act of the like description.” In Anyanwu v South Bank Student Union [2001] UKHL 14 – HL a student alleged that the university aided the students union in dismissing him from his job in the union. This appeal was decided on the correct interpretation and application of the word “aids”. Similarly in the case of Hallam v Chletenham BC [2001] UKHL 15 – HL the case was also decided on the interpretation of the word “aids”. It was held that this word means to actively and closely be involved with another party to carryout an act and not merely to induce someone to carry out some act. This interpretation shows the degree to which courts sometimes go to reach decisions even when on the face of it there seems to be no ambiguity. Words are also capable of having a broad meaning such as in Section 1 of Dangerous Dogs Act 1991: “controls the possession, disposal and breeding of dogs of the type known as pit bull terriers.” Here the intention of Parliament was to control Pit Bull terriers only. However it caused problems in the case of Knightsbridge Crown Court Ex Parte Dunne [1994] 1 WLR 296. Here, the Court held that the word ‘type’ can apply to dogs possessing a substantial number of the characteristics of Pit Bull terriers, for example Rottweilers or Pit Bull/Staffordshire cross breeds and similar breeds. So, unintentionally, other dogs were caught up in the Act’s provisions. Errors in drafting have also been known to happen. These problems arise where the Parliamentary Counsel makes a mistake that was overlooked as the Bill passed through its Parliamentary stages.
|
|
|
|
Still Can't Find What Your Looking For? Then Try a Essay Search!
|
