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What was the motivation behind US policy with respect to the government-sanctioned overthrow of the democratically-elected government of Iran in 1953? On August 19, 1953, the United States sanctioned its first, peacetime use of covert action to overthrow the constitutional government of a sovereign nation, successfully orchestrating the overthrow of Iran’s popular Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, and restoring the Shah to his throne. The question is -- why? Thesis This paper will argue that the Marxist framework of international relations -- namely that economic interest determines politics and political structure, and that the goal of economic (and political) activity is the redistribution of wealth and power -- provides the most effective explanation as to the driving force behind the US government’s fateful decision. The paper will reconstruct the information available to the Eisenhower administration up to the planning and execution of Operation Ajax, as the coup came to be called by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), so as to ascertain the key elements that would have factored into the government’s foreign policy decision-making process prior to the event. It will then illustrate the aptness of Marxist theory, first, of its own accord, as well as through offering a comparative analysis of an alternative Realist theory. Finally, the paper will conclude by distinguishing between the US government’s motivation versus its justification for the coup, thereby demonstrating not only why but also how this particular foreign policy decision was undertaken. Two prevailing theories have been posited to explain the rationale behind the US government’s decision to topple the Iranian government in 1953. The first is a Realist notion, a key proposition of which is the balancing of power between states. This argument proposes that US decision makers concluded that the regime of Mohammad Mossadegh posed a sufficient threat to US national interests to merit overthrow. This explanation claims that, given the Cold War fears prevalent at the time, that the United States suspected Mossadegh of having Communist sympathies and saw him as becoming increasingly alienated from the West and more closely allied with Iran’s Soviet-dominated Tudeh Party, and so feared Iran would likely fall within the Communist orbit. Therefore, Realism, saw international anarchy as having fostered competition and conflict among states, and states as having had survival as their core interest. Thus, the Realist explanation positions the US-backed coup of Iran as essentially a struggle for power between the Cold War superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union, played out on Iranian soil. The second theory is the Marxist belief, which says that Mossadegh’s real “crime”, in the eyes of US officials, had been to nationalize Iran’s oil industry. Marxists say the political motives at work can only be expressed in terms of the economic, given that every conflict is one of power and power depends on resources. This explanation claims that what was, in fact, threatened was not Iran’s ideological sovereignty but the huge, potential profits of foreign oil companies which were, given Mossadegh’s nationalization scheme, excluded from operating in Iran’s vast oilfields. Marxists contend that in pursuit of wealth and power, nations, whether capitalist, socialist, or fascist, contend over the territorial division and exploitation of the globe. Therefore, US policymakers were driven by the desire to ensure that US oil companies would gain a share in Iran’s lucrative oil production. Mohammad Mossadegh Since both theories rest heavily on the US’ assessment of the Iranian Prime Minister and the decisions he was or was not likely to take -- whether as a potential Communist sympathizer or as an economically-savvy, and therefore menacing developing country leader -- it is important to establish who Mohammad Mossadegh was and how he was perceived by the United States. Mossadegh was a lawyer and wealthy landowner who had been a prominent political figure in Iran since the early 1900s. In his long years in public service, Mossadegh had gained a reputation as a liberal democrat and an ardent nationalist. A New York Times article, published in 1952, noted that “prevailing opinion among detached observers in Tehran [is that] Mossadegh is the most popular politician in the country.” By the late 1940s, he had identified himself with two main issues: a desire to transfer political power from the royal court to the parliament, and a desire to increase Iran’s control over its oil industry, which was then controlled by the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). These two issues eclipsed all others in 1949, when a new oil agreement favorable to the AIOC, which was made possible by the refusal of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, to renegotiate or nationalize the AOIC concession, was announced and when the Shah tried to rig the 16th Majlis (parliamentary) elections. These actions enraged the opposition. Large demonstrations ensued and an organized known as the National Front was formed to coordinate opposition to the Shah and to the British. Mossadegh soon emerged as its de facto leader… In March 1951, Mossadegh submitted a bill calling for nationalization of the oil industry to the Majlis, which was passed by a unanimous vote in the Iranian parliament and was supported by the overwhelming majority of the Iranian people, for reasons of both economic justice and national pride. A month later, the Shah, yielding to a rising tide of popular pressure, appointed Mossadegh to be Prime Minister on April 29, 1951. Two days later, and immediately after taking office, Mossadegh signed the nationalization bill into law. The nationalization law quickly brought Mossadegh into direct conflict with the British government, which owned 50 percent of the AIOC’s stock. The Mossadegh government attempted to placate the British, first by offering to set aside 25 percent of the net profits of the oil operation as compensation, then by guaranteeing the safety and jobs of the British employees, and finally by offering to sell its oil without disturbance to the control system, which was valued highly by the international oil giants. However, the British would accept nothing short of the 50-50 profit sharing arrangement they had enjoyed prior to the nationalization law. In retaliation, the British adopted a three-track strategy designed to reestablish their control over Iran’s oil. First the British pressured Mossadegh through direct negotiations. Unsatisfied, they appealed to the International Court, the United Nations, and the United States for intervention. When that did not produce the desired results, the British navy commenced military maneuvers in the region, which were accompanied by the imposition of economic sanctions on Iran, a British-led international boycott, and a freezing of Iranian assets -- all of which combined to bring Iran’s oil exports and foreign trade to a virtual standstill and plunged the already impoverished country to near destitution. Finally, without having achieved their intended objective, the British opted to remove Mossadegh from office altogether. Hearing of a cabal to oust him, and suspecting British involvement, Mossadegh expelled the remaining British workers from Iran’s oilfields on September 20, 1951, prompting the British to make plans to invade Iran at Abadan.
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